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DOWNZONING IN OKLAHOMA: A PREVIEW
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The situation is not uncommon: the landowner's homesite is a
parcel bound on three sides by a business district, a shopping center,
and a major traffic artery. Zoned for commercial use, the property is
worth $250,000. Upon being rezoned by the town board to a residen-
tial classification, however, the parcel's market value plummets to
$35,000. One decision by the town board has cost the landowner
$215,000.' Such rezoning to limit the intensity or amount of permitted
uses of land is called downzoning.2
As the word implies, downzoning occurs after an area has already
been zoned.' It, therefore, differs from typical zoning legislation where
a comprehensive plan is implemented for the first time. As a result of
this difference, the landowner who purchased the lot under the impres-
sion that, along with the deed, he had acquired a vested right to prop-
erty values under the present zoning classification, may be sorrowfully
mistaken.' That is, as the use of his land becomes more restricted, its
value decreases.
Because downzoning can cause sharp and unexpected decreases in
land value, courts require that such legislation have a rational basis.5
Courts may, however, apply various tests to decide whether, in a spe-
cific instance, downzoning legislation has such a rational basis. 6 While
downzoning standards vary from state to state, within any single state,
only one test is applied. Generally, state courts haye derived downzon-
1. See, e.g., Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 260 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. 1965), lnodxfed, 272
N.Y.S.2d 713, appeal denied, 18 N.Y.2d 853, 275 N.Y.S.2d 856, 222 N.E.2d 614 (1966).
2. See generally Linowes & Delaney, Downzoning-And How the Landowner May Fight Ii, 5
REAL EST. L.J. 311 (1977).
3. Id.
4. That [the landowner] is not completely happy residing in a house pretty well sur-
rounded by businesses and a shopping center does not 4Osofacto mean that the Town has
breached a duty, or broken a promise to him, implied or otherwise. The existence of a
degree of hardship on [the landowner's] part, as contrasted with an absolute hardship, is
not sufficient to sustain his severe burden of proof in this action.
Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 260 N.Y.S.2d 96, 99 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
5. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 21-43 infra and accompanying text.
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ing standards from those used in upzoning disputes.7
An upzoning dispute typically arises when a landowner seeks to
have his property rezoned to permit a greater number of uses. Thus
downzoning creates greater use restrictions on the land, and upzoning
removes use restrictions.
Oklahoma courts have resolved upzoning disputes,8 but they have
not yet been faced with a downzoning dispute. The thesis of this com-
ment is that the Oklahoma courts, when faced with downzoning dis-
putes, will derive downzoning standards from those they have applied
in upzoning actions. This thesis is based on two premises. First, the
purposes and effects of downzoning are the same as the purposes and
effects of refusal to upzone. Second, other states have resolved
downzoning disputes by use of the same standards that they have
found applicable to refusals to upzone. To support these premises and
the conclusion,9 public policy factors of downzoning are surveyed,' 0
and factors comprising the tests for valid downzoning are discussed."
Then, upzoning is analogized to downzoning by a demonstration of the
similarity of the purposes and effects of refusal to upzone and those of
downzoning. 12 In addition, the tests and factors involved in refusal to
upzone cases in foreign state courts are shown to be the same tests and
controlling factors those courts have applied in downzoning cases. 13
Finally, the judicial test and controlling factors for Oklahoma refusal
to upzone cases are set forth."4 Thus, this comment demonstrates that
Oklahoma courts can reasonably be expected to apply their refusal to
upzone standards when faced with a downzoning dispute.
7. Commenting on judicial review of downzoning disputes, one author has concluded:
"The courts have proved generally consistent in applying the same rationale for deciding
downzoning cases as in deciding other rezoning matters, but they appear to worry more about the
former." Staples, Downzoning-Is It Legal and Is It Right?, 1976 PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT
DOMAIN INST. 119.
8. Lakewood Dev. Co. v. Oklahoma City, 534 P.2d 23 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974), illustrates a
typical zoning dispute before it is taken into a court. A shopping center owner sought to have
adjoining land upzoned in order to expand his business. The owner applied to the city council for
a rezoning classification from a single family dwelling district to a local commercial district. First,
the application was channeled to the city planning commission. After studying the relevant physi-
cal and economic characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood, the commission recommended
approval of the application. Despite this unanimous recommendation by the planning commis-
sion, the city council rejected the application, resulting in a court action brought by the landowner
to contest the refusal to upzone his property.
9. See notes 15-58 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 15-20 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 21-58 infra and accompanying text.
12. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
13. See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 61-89 infra and accompanying text.
1979)
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF DOWNZONING
A. The Public Policies of Downzoning
Municipalities use their downzoning power 5 to direct, to control,
and often to curtail growth and development. Moreover, towns use
downzoning to achieve these purposes in many ways. Assume, for ex-
ample, that a town board passes an ordinance which provides for auto-
matic downzoning of all land to be taken by eminent domain. Because
the fair market value that the town pays the landowner will be based
on a downzoned classification, that value may be less than the owner
paid for the property, and if so he will suffer a loss on the condemna-
tion. Thus, the town can exercise great latitude in compensating pri-
vate landowners for property taken for municipal development. At
least one court has viewed such downzoning as an unlawful confisca-
tion of property.
16
In lieu of downzoning a tract concurrently with condemnation as a
means of controlling growth and development, the downzoning may
also be done in anticipation of taking the tract for public use. In one
case, for example, the county council downzoned a tract in order to
depress its value in the event that the town ever wished to acquire the
tract for incorporation into a public park, and the court upheld the
downzoning as legal. 17 Moreover, rather than downzone one tract of
land for some narrow purpose, such as park development, a municipal-
ity may downzone as part of a comprehensive controlled growth plan.'"
Balanced community planning is accomplished in several states
through such master plans that detail the pattern of municipal growth
and development.' 9 Finally, downzoning may occur with no purpose
more specific than to lock the downzoned area into a pattern of non-
growth until the town board is ready to permit development. The va-
lidity of such a moratorium on growth and development is usually
15. See note 21 infra and accompanying text for limitations of this power.
16. Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 31 111. App. 3d 88, 334
N.E.2d 810 (1975) (condemnee was successful in attacking the validity of the zoning ordinance in
the eminent domain action such that his property was freed of downzoned restrictions),
17. County Council v. District Land Corp., 274 Md. 691, 337 A.2d 712 (1975) (downzoning
upheld because evidence of planner's purpose being future acquisition for a public park held
inadmissible).
18. See, e.g., Golden v. Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (phased growth plan was found to be within the ambit of zoning
enabling legislation authorizing regulation of building height and placement).
19. For a survey of existing and proposed controlled growth ordinances, see genera/l
Landman, No Mr. Bosselman, the Town of Ramapo Cannot Pass a Law to Bind the Rights ofthe
Miole World- A Reply (Part 1), 10 TULSA L.J. 169 (1974).
[Vol. 14:798
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determined by the reasonableness of its purpose, its severity, and its
duration.2'
B. Judicial Tests for Downzoning Validity
Euclid v. Ambler Realty2 established a municipality's right to
make zoning classifications under its police powers. The Euclid stan-
dard requires that, to be invalid, a zoning ordinance must be clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable and be without substantial relation to pub-
lic health, safety, morals, or general welfare.22 Obviously, downzoning
is a type of zoning; therefore, such legislation is subject to Euclid.
Courts have consistently applied the Euclid rationale, but they
have done so by means of a variety of tests. In other words, some
courts have used Euclid as a backdrop to another more definite test in
downzoning disputes; other courts have directly applied Euclid. Tests
that courts have applied in resolving downzoning disputes include: the
mistake, or change of conditions, test; the all beneficial use test; and the
discrimination test. These tests, as well as the direct application of Eu-
clid, will now be discussed.
1. Mistake, or Change of Conditions, Test
One test that courts have used to measure a municipality's con-
formance with the Euclid standard of rationality is the mistake, or
change of conditions, test. A Virginia court used this test in nullifying
a piecemeal downzoning ordinance.2" The court held that where a
landowner makes a prima facie showing that his property was
downzoned without either a mistake in the original zoning scheme or a
change in circumstances, the burden of proof shifts to the municipality
to show otherwise.24
20. See, e.g., Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Myack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244
N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969) (downzoning which barred new construction of multiple
dwellings throughout the municipality and which was not limited to any period of time, was
invalid as it prevented the landowner from using the land for any purpose to which the land was
reasonably adapted and therefore constituted a taking which is only permissible through the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain).
21. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
22. Id. at 395.
23. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 665, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974) (election
of a new board of supervisors did not constitute a change of conditions as to justify adoption of
piecemeal downzoning).
24. Id. at _, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
1979]
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2. All Beneficial Use Test
Another test courts have used to measure a municipality's con-
formance with the Euclid standard is based on whether the rezoning
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his land. A classification
which substantially renders the land useless for all reasonable purposes
will not be found to meet Euclid's standard of reasonableness. 2  As this
test applies to downzoning cases, the modifier "substantially" may be
particularly important in terms of how restrictively the land may be
zoned. It would seem that land could be rezoned to a more restrictive
classification without rendering the land substantially useless.26 This
downzoning could, nevertheless, produce drastic economic conse-
quences for the landowner. If the property, for example, was zoned for
heavy industrial use initially, downzoning to allow only light industrial
use does not deprive the landowner of all beneficial use of the parcel
such that it has been rendered substantially uspless for all reasonable
purposes.2 This downzoning could, however, produce drastic eco-
nomic consequences for the owner who, after holding the property for
years in order to sell it to an industrial developer, learns that the land
has been downzoned with a resulting drastic diminution in market
value.
For this reason, courts may often look at the peculiar suitability of
a tract for a specific purpose.28 This approach was taken in an action
where the landowner challenged the downzoning of a triangular parcel
from a light industrial to a residential classification.2 9 The court held
the downzoning void, stating that "an effort to create a no man's land
or buffer zone in property of the appellees for the benefit of others by
preventing the appellees from using their property for any of the pur-
poses for which it is peculiarly suitable . . . is not permissible."3
25. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966) (downzoning found to
be constitutional unless it practically or substantially rendered the land useless for all reasonable
purposes).
26. Id. at _, 146 N.W.2d at 406.
27. See, e.g., Dustin v. Mayor of Rockville, 23 Md. App. 389, 328 A.2d 748 (1974) (downzon-
ing which prevents residents from using the tract as a recreation area was upheld as not depriving
them of all beneficial use of the land).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at _, 328 A.2d at 768 (quoting Mayor of Rockville v. Cotder, 230 Md. 335, 340, 187
A.2d 94, 97 (1963) (citations omitted)).
[Vol. 14:798
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3. Discrimination Test
A third test that courts have used to apply the Euclid standard of
rationality is the discrimination test. Zoning which favors one land-
owner over another will be invalid as discriminatory if it merely serves
a private purpose.31 Even where the downzoning results in a public
benefit, however, the discrimination test may nullify the ordinance if it
causes severe harm to an individual.32 That is, if the harm to the indi-
vidual outweighs any public benefit resulting from the downzoning,
that downzoning may be invalid. When a downzoning ordinance re-
sulted in a landowner's parcel being reduced to a public-parking classi-
fication, for example, the New York Court of Appeals nullified the
ordinance as placing an undue, uncompensated burden on the individ-
ual landowner for the benefit of the public.33
4. The Direct Euclid Test
In determining the validity of a downzoning ordinance, some
courts34 have applied the general Euclid standard directly.35 Hence, no
liaison test is applied to the facts of a downzoning case to implement
the general Euclid standard by which these facts are to be judged.36
Again, Euclid requires that a zoning ordinance be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and be substantially related to public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare.
The Supreme Court of Colorado, for example, used the direct Eu-
clid test in deciding that downzoning of land from suburban business
district to multi-family residential, after it had been annexed by the
municipality, was not unreasonable.37 Adding gloss to the direct Eu-
31. See Linowes & Delaney, supra note 2, at 318.
32. Id.
33. Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, -, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519
(1954): "However compelling and acute the community traffic problem may be, its solution does
not lie in placing an undue and uncompensated burden on the individual owner... in the guise
of regulation, even for a public purpose."
34. E.g., Bird v. City of Colorado Springs, 489 P.2d 324 (Colo. 1971); Weibrecht v. City of
Chicago, 14 Ill. App. 3d 1062, 304 N.E.2d 9 (1973).
35. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
36. But see notes 41-42 infra and accompanying text.
37. The court held:
Zoning ordinances or regulations will not be declared unreasonable and arbitrary
unless plainly and palpably so, or if enforced the consequent restrictions will preclude
the use of the property for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted, and if the
unreasonableness thereof is fairly debatable such ordinance must be upheld.
Bird v. City of Colorado Springs, 489 P.2d 324,327 (Colo. 1971) (quoting Baum v. City of Denver,
363 P.2d 688, 694 (Colo. 1971)).
1979]
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c/id test, the court said that not only must the aggrieved landowners
show that the action of the municipality was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious (the Euclid standard),38 but the landowners must also prove
this proposition beyond a reasonable doubt.39  Thus, in Colorado,
downzoning is entitled to a presumption of validity once it has been
enacted. The landowner then bears the burden of overcoming that pre-
sumption.40
5. The Fair Debate Test
Finally, the direct Euclid test (as well as the mistake, or change of
conditions, test) has been modified at times by a fair debate test.4 I This
test is used with the direct Euclid standard to decide whether the ag-
grieved landowner has proven that the disputed downzoning is arbi-
trary and capricious beyond the realm of fair debate.42 Likewise, the
fair debate rule has been coupled with the mistake, or change of condi-
tions, test. Because the municipality has the burden of proof under this
latter test,43 it must produce evidence of mistake or change of condi-
tions which makes the reasonableness of the downzoning grounds for
fair debate.
C Controlling Factors in Downzoning Disputes. Economic and
Physical
Regardless of which of the above tests is applied to resolve the
ultimate issue of whether a downzoning ordinance meets the Euclid
standard, a court will weigh the controlling factors that are peculiar to
whichever test that court uses. Although the particular factors are
unique in each controversy, they generally comprise two categories.
First, the courts have examined the pecuniary loss of the aggrieved
landowner. Second, the courts have considered those physical factors
38. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
39. 489 P.2d at 326.
40. Id. at 325.
41. See, e.g., Tilley v. Rogers, 405 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. 1966) (courts have no authority to inter-
fere with a downzoning ordinance if the reasonableness of the change is evidenced by fact issues
which are fairly debatable).
42. A Texas court has defined "fairly debatable" as the "issuable facts" rule of evidence,
meaning anyone attacking a zoning ordinance has the burden of showing that no controversial
facts or conditions existed which would authorize the zoning, and if reasonable minds could differ,
the zoning is valid. City of Waxahachie v. Watkins, 154 Tex. 206, 275 S.W.2d 477 (1955). This
rule may now be limited solely to original zonings unless there is a change of conditions. Thomp-
son v. City of Palestine, 510 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. 1974).
43. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 665,-.., 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974).
[Vol. 14:798
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relevant to the downzoned parcel. Several examples will demonstrate
judicial approaches to these factors in downzoning actions.
1. Controlling Economic Factors
Judicial focus on pecuniary considerations in downzoning cases
was demonstrated in Town of Hempstead v. Lynne.4 A group of devel-
opers planned construction of a shopping center on a tract zoned for
business use, going to great expense to prepare the area for develop-
ment.45 To prevent the proposed construction, the town board
downzoned the parcel from a business classification to a residential
classification. The result was a $90,000 reduction in the market value
of that parcel. The court held that, in determining the reasonableness
of this residential development, economic feasibility is one of the vital
elements to be considered.46 In considering this vital element, the court
said that the mere lessening of profits does not render a zoning ordi-
nance confiscatory. 47 Nevertheless, the court held that where the only
choice offered the landowner was either to leave his land or to develop
it for the more restricted use at a substantial loss of his actual invest-
ment, the downzoning scheme was not reasonably adapted to the use.48
44. 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1961).
45. The court found:
Taxes were paid on the capital gain realized and there is nothing in the record
which indicates that the price paid was at variance with true value. The sum actually
paid, then, i.e., $177,600, must be considered as the defendant's investment.
To this figure must be added the following sums:
(1) $140,000, cost of 151,000 cubic yards of hydraulic fill to bring the grade to
elevation 8-1/2, the minimum grade required by the Town's building code for business
development, which was actually expended by defendant between June 1960 and April
1961.
(2) $8,440, cost to defendant of additional soil tests to comply with Town's re-
quirements before the building permit could be issued.
(3) $9,000, cost of engineering and development plans for the proposed shopping
center.
(4) $16,300, cost of widening Hungry Harbor Road attributable to the 11.1-acre
parcel. (In this connection the court holds that the widening of the road was of direct
benefit not only to this 11. 1-acre parcel, but also to 70.4 additional acres representing the
total acreage shown on nine maps filed by the defendant with the County Planning Com-
mission on which the widened road was delineated. Thus, 11/8 Ists. of the stipulated
cost of $120,000 for the road widening is found to be a direct investment in the parcel.)
Considering the initial investment and the foregoing expenditures already incurred,
it is found that the defendant's total present investment in the 11.1-acre parcel amounts
to $351,340.
Id. at _, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
46. Id. at _ 222 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
47. Compare Stevens v. Town of Huntington, 260 N.Y.S.2d 96 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modifled, 272
N.Y.S.2d 713, appeal denied, 18 N.Y.2d 853, 275 N.Y.S.2d 856, 222 N.E.2d 614 (1966) with Morse
v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
48. 32 Misc. 2d at -, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 532.
1979]
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Spotlighting the importance of pecuniary loss to the landowner in a
downzoning situation, the Lynne court related it to the reasonableness
requirement49 of the Euclid standard."0
2. Controlling Physical Factors
To determine whether a downzoning ordinance satisfies the Euclid
requirement of substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare,5 ' courts have looked at the second major group of
determinants, those physical factors relevant to the downzoned parcel.
Shellburne, Inc. v. Conner,12 for example, involved a fact situation
similar to that in Lynne. The landowner, a corporation, purchased
property in anticipation of eventual development as a neighborhood
shopping center. The tract was zoned for business use. Shortly after
the landowner obtained a building permit, the county council
downzoned the land to a residential classification. The owner attacked
the downzoning as invalid, claiming that the action was arbitrary and
capricious53 and hence not substantially related to public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.54 Without ignoring the economic factors of
lost profits and a decreased market value resulting from the downzon-
ing,"5 the court's principal focus was on the ramifications that the
downzoning would have on the surrounding neighborhood.56 To dis-
cern what this impact would be, the court applied the direct Euclid
test5 7 to those physical factors relevant to the downzoning ordinance.
These factors included: the surrounding property; the shape of the par-
cel in regard to potential parking problems; the potential problems of
allowing commercial ventures to be near area schools; the availability
of alternative shopping in the area; and the potential lack of control
over future planned development if construction of the shopping center
was permitted.58
49. Id.
50. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. 315 A.2d 620 (Del. Ch. 1974), aif'd, 336 A.2d 568 (Del. 1975).
53. Id. at 621.
54. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
55. 315 A.2d at 624.
56. Id. at 623-24.
57. See notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text.
58. The court found the following to be the basis for the recommendation to rezone:
The subject property is surrounded by residential-type development and is across
the street from a school and church complex.
The shape of the parcel is rectangular, thereby creating a difficult design problem
[Vol. 14:798
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Thus far the purposes, the judicial tests, and the controlling factors
of downzoning have been analyzed. This analysis is based on non-
Oklahoma downzoning cases since Oklahoma has yet to face a
downzoning dispute. Again, the conclusion of this comment is that
Oklahoma courts should apply the same standards to downzoning as
they have applied to refusal to upzone cases. The first premise from
which this conclusion is drawn is that the purposes and effects of
downzoning are the same as those underlying refusal to upzone. To
establish this premise, refusal to upzone must be analyzed.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF REFUSAL TO UPZONE
A. The Public Policies Behind Upzoning Standards
Refusal to upzone is illustrated by the situation where a parcel is
zoned for single family residential use, but it is located in an evolving
area where the character of the land has become clearly more suited for
a light industrial classification. If the town board refuses to upzone the
parcel for light industrial use, it has placed an artificial restriction on
the full value of that land. 9 Here, as in downzoning, the landowner is
prevented from realizing a part of his land's value. Refusal to upzone
land in such areas has an impact which parallels the results of
downzoning. First, the policies behind refusal to upzone are the same
as those behind downzoning. That is, both types of zoning ordinances
are directed toward controlling development. Second, the effect of re-
fusal to upzone and of downzoning on the landowner is the same. This
is true because in either instance the owner of the land would be de-
for access, parking, and siting of buildings so as to minimize impact, if it is developed
commercially.
Presumably, if commercial use is developed, it will probably cater in part to that
element of the market represented by school children, thereby drawing children back
and forth across Shipley Road who would otherwise have no occasion to cross the heav-
ily traveled artery. Furthermore, the mixture of commercial and educational land uses
in general should not be encouraged as an acceptable planning concept.
The subject property is between an elementary school and the service area of the
school-thereby contributing to a potential conflict between school uses and commercial
oriented vehicles, school children and other pedestrians.
There is no control over the shape or placement of the commercial use relative to
the surrounding land uses-that is, there is only one place for the development to occur
with no opportunity for planned development.
Existing commercial development serving the full-range of consumer needs is con-
veniently located within several minutes of the subject property, e.g., Merchandise Mart,
Gaylords, Graylyn Shopping Center.
315 A.2d at 623.
59. "Full value" is used here to represent what a buyer would reasonably pay for a tract in
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prived of a portion of the full former value of his land measured prior
to the zoning action.
B. Judicial Tests for Refusal to Upzone
Because the purposes and effects of downzoning and refusal to
upzone can be equated, it is reasonable to assume that the judicial test
for these two types of zoning will be the same. This conclusion is borne
out by the fact (the second premise of this comment) that in states
where both types of zoning have been litigated, the same judicial test
has been used.6" In other words, the mistake, or change of conditions,
test, the all beneficial use test, the discrimination test, and the direct
Euclid test are upzoning tests as well as downzoning tests. Thus,
whichever of these tests a state uses, it will use that test for both types of
zoning cases.
C Controlling Factors in Upzoning Disputes." Economic and Physical
The conclusion that states apply the same judicial test to resolve
both upzoning and downzoning disputes implies that the same physical
and economic factors comprising that judicial test will control in both
types of cases. In fact, the Oklahoma upzoning cases about to be dis-
cussed demonstrate the similar role of economic and physical factors in
resolving both downzoning and upzoning disputes.
IV. UPZONING CASES IN OKLAHOMA
Again, the point of this comment is to predict what test Oklahoma
courts will apply in downzoning disputes. Since non-Oklahoma courts
have derived downzoning tests from tests used in upzoning disputes,
Oklahoma downzoning actions will probably, be resolved under the
same standards which have been applied in upzoning disputes. There-
fore, to predict the Oklahoma downzoning test, the Oklahoma upzon-
ing standard must be established.
In short, the following analysis of Oklahoma upzoning cases will
demonstrate that Oklahoma applies the direct Euclid test as modified
by the fair debate rule. Recall that under this test and rule, the zoning
will be struck down if it is arbitrary and capricious beyond the realm of
fair debate. Hence, this comment predicts that Oklahoma courts will
60. See, e.g., Dustin v. Mayor of Rockville, 23 Md. App. 389, 328 A.2d 748 (1974) (where the
all beneficial use test was applied to a downzoning dispute).
[Vol. 14:798
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apply the direct Euclid test as modified by the fair debate rule to
downzoning disputes. For purposes of analysis, the Oklahoma cases
have been distinguished on the basis of whether physical or economic
factors controlled the outcome of that particular case.
A. Controlling Physical Factors
Physical factors were the court's primary concern in City of Tulsa
v. Nicholas.6' That case involved an owner's application to the plan-
ning commission to have his land upzoned so that he could practice
medicine in a home/office. The area was traversed by 16,000 vehicles
per day and included a four lane, heavily occupied street, a school, a
church, and a restaurant. Faced with these facts, the court granted the
owner's request. The court used the direct Euclid test,62 relying espe-
cially on the second part of the test which requires a substantial rela-
tionship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.63 In
conformance with the second part of the test, the court gave particular
attention to the physical factors relevant to the upzoning. The judge, in
fact, found that the import of these factors merited his personally view-
ing the involved area.64 The court candidly said: "This court has pre-
viously given approval to judicial relaxation of restrictions on property,
originally residential, where conditions have changed, and such restric-
tions. . . have failed to preserve an area's comparative value for resi-
dential use".65  As in many downzoning decisions,66  Nicholas
demonstrated the importance of the physical characteristics of the sur-
rounding neighborhood in resolving the matter.
Physical factors were also given substantial weight in City of Tulsa
61. 415 P.2d 917 (Okla. 1966).
62. See notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text.
63. 415 P.2d at 923.
64. Id. at 920.
65. Id. at 923. The court examined each physical factor in detail:
Many employees of the American Air Lines and the Douglas Aircraft Plant, which
are in a northerly direction from the subject area, use Sheridan in going to and from
their work. On this Street's segment . . . there are electric traffic control lights at its
intersections with I th Street, Admiral Place, and Fourth Place, which latter is also a 4-
lane, heavily traveled street, but is only 44 feet in width. North of Second Street, on
Sheridan, there is a large drive-in restaurant, as well as a Texaco Filling Station. There
are other stations of that character on Sheridan, between Fifth Place and Seventh Street,
and at Sheridan's intersections with 7th and 11 th Streets. Between Seventh and Ninth
Streets, there is an apartment building on Sheridan's west side. North of Third Street,
along Sheridan's west side, is a combined elementary and junior high school, with adja-
cent play grounds, including an outdoor basket ball [sic] court.
Id. at 921.
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v. Mobley6 7 where property owners sought unsuccessfully to have their
land upzoned in order to construct a supermarket. The record reflected
that the tract was bound by a four-lane, heavily traveled highway. The
area, which had a ten story building standing and a thirty story build-
ing under construction, had been given a multi-family classification.
There was a group of businesses four blocks away to the north and a
large urban renewal area to the west.68 Taking note of these determi-
nants, the court coupled the fairly debatable rule69 with the direct Eu-
clid test.7° The court held that the basic physical facts7 relevant to the
refusal to upzone were evidence that the zoning commission had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the landowner's application.72
Because this finding was not even fairly debatable, according to the
court, the ordinance was held to be invalid.73 In taking note of the
nature of the tract, the surrounding property, recent expansive trends in
the area, and adjoining zoning ordinances,74 the Mobley court thus
considered the same and similar physical factors to 'be determinative as
have the courts in their downzoning disputes.75
B. Controlling Economic Factors
More recently, Lakewood Development Co. v. Oklahoma Ciy7 6
gave considerable attention to the court's other major area of concern:
economic hardship endured by a landowner whose request for upzon-
ing is denied. There the owner had purchased six houses next to its
shopping center and had sought to have the parcels upzoned from resi-
dential to commercial use. One city witness, a professional real estate
appraiser, stated that from the standpoint of pure economics the best
67. 454 P.2d 901 (Okla. 1969).
68. Id. at 903.
69. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text.
71. 454 P.2d at 904.
72. Id.
73. The trial court undoubtedly considered all of the basic physical facts, including, the
nature of the subject property and surrounding property, the use to which each has been
put, recent trends of development, the zoning of the adjoining block for commercial
purposes, the urban renewal project to the west, the construction of large apartment com-
plexes in the surrounding area, and the need for commercial facilities. On the contents
of the record and on the fact of the trial court's findings it appears that the judgment
rezoning the subject property has a reasonable basis and was justified.
Id.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Shellburne Inc. v. Conner, 315 A.2d 620 (Del. Ch. 1974), aft'd, 336 A.2d 568
(Del. 1975).
76. 534 P.2d 23 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
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use of the property was for commercial purposes.7 The property was
appraised for commercial purposes at $217,000 as compared with a
value of $28,319 for residential use-a difference of $188,68l1.7 The
court stated that these economic considerations were among the perti-
nent facts which evidenced the unreasonableness of the refusal to
upzone.79
Similarly, in Tulsa Rock Co. v. Board of County Commissioners,8"
the court appeared to give great weight to whether the landowner
would suffer unpreventable economic hardship8 as a result of the mu-
nicipality's refusal to upzone the parcel to a classification of "min-
ing."8 2 The court reasoned that, although the refusal to upzone did not
allow the property owner to realize the full value83 of the parcel, the
value of the land under the more restrictive classification (after the re-
fusal to upzone) was still higher than the owner's original investment.8 4
In addition, the court took notice of the fact that economic operations
on the land until the upzoning request was denied had produced suffi-
cient profit to compensate the landowner for the value lost due to the
refusal.85 Having examined these factors, the court held that the re-
fusal to upzone was neither arbitrary nor capricious,86 as the reasona-
bleness of the economic considerations was at least fairly debatable.
The language of this case thus demonstrated that, like foreign state
courts that have faced zoning disputes,88 Oklahoma courts consider ec-
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id.
79. After examining the potential commercial obsolescence which the refusal to rezone from
residential to commercial use would cause to surrounding properties, the court concluded:
We hold as did the trial court that the city council's action "enforcing the 'A' Single
Family Dwelling ordinance was arbitrary and capricious," because the facts support but
one non-debatable conclusion-that the refusal to rezone the plaintiff's lot to "E" local
commercial was unreasonable.
Id. at 27.
80. 531 P.2d 351 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974).
81. Id. at 358.
82. Id.
83. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
84. 531 P.2d at 358.
85. Id. Although this case involved a situation where the landowner was requesting a rezon-
ing to a less restrictive classification, it is nevertheless similar to a downzoning situation since the
land which was unzoned when the purchaser acquired it for mining use was subsequently zoned
for agricultural use.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 358-59.
88. See, e.g., Town of Hempstead v. Lynne, 32 Misc. 2d 312, 222 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1961). The
court went into great detail in weighing the economic considerations.
Against the investment must be compared the present value of the land as zoned for
residential purposes. The court finds that the 1 .1-acre parcel will yield 47 plots of 6,000
14
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onomic loss to the landowner to be a controlling factor in deciding the
reasonableness of a municipality's refusal to upzone.89
V. CONCLUSION
This comment has shown that Oklahoma courts will probably ap-
ply the same standards to downzoning actions, when they arise, as they
have applied to upzoning disputes. This conclusion has been shown to
follow from two premises. First, the purposes and effects of downzon-
ing are the same as those of refusal to upzone, as illustrated by a com-
parison of upzoning and downzoning actions.90 Second, other states
have applied upzoning tests to resolve downzoning disputes.91
An analysis of Oklahoma upzoning cases has revealed that the Eu-
clid rationality test has been applied,92 as modified by the fair debate
rule. Hence, this author predicts that the Oklahoma courts will apply
the direct Euclid test when faced with a downzoning dispute. That is,
the courts will ask whether downzoning is clearly arbitrary and capri-
cious and without substantial relationship to public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.93 If the answer to this question is affirma-
tive beyond the realm of fair debate,94 then the downzoning ordinance
will be invalid. This ability to arrive at a reasonable prediction of judi-
cial behavior is important in itself as well. "Such stability and predict-
ability in the law serve the interest of both the landowner and the
public."95
A110~ Hof
square feet each. Each plot has a market value of approximately $6,000. Thus, the total
market value of the parcel zoned for residential purposes is $282,000. However, in order
to bring the property into marketable condition, the entire parcel must be filled with
approximately 11,000 cubic yards of additional fill in order to bring the elevation to
grade 9, the minimum elevation required for residential construction. The cost of this
additional fill, inclusive of incidental survey and engineering plans, is in the vicinity of
$22,000, which figure must be deducted from the foregoing valuation to arrive at the true
net market value of the 11.1-acre parcel, which is $260,000.
Id. at _, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
89. 531 P.2d at 358.
90. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 61-89 supra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 34-43 supra and accompanying text.
94. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
95. Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 665, , 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974).
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